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Abstract
Robustness of deep learning models is a property that has recently gained increasing attention.
We explore a notion of robustness for generative adversarial models that is pertinent to their internal
interactive structure, and show that, perhaps surprisingly, the GAN in its original form is not robust.
Our notion of robustness relies on a perturbed discriminator, or noisy, adversarial interference with
its feedback. We explore, theoretically and empirically, the effect of model and training properties on
this robustness. In particular, we show theoretical conditions for robustness that are supported by
empirical evidence. We also test the effect of regularization. Our results suggest variations of GANs
that are indeed more robust to noisy attacks and have more stable training behavior, requiring less
regularization in general. Inspired by our theoretical results, we further extend our framework to
obtain a class of models related to WGAN, with good empirical performance. Overall, our results
suggest a new perspective on understanding and designing GAN models from the viewpoint of their
internal robustness.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the adversarial training of generative models (GANs) [20] has received much attention
and found numerous applications, including realistic image generation, text to image synthesis, 3D
object generation, and video prediction [35, 45, 47]. Despite their success, GANs have known training
instabilities [19], and many recent works address this issue by either modifying the objective function,
the network architecture or training dynamics [1, 2, 6, 7, 15, 19, 22, 24, 26, 28, 31, 36, 51].
In general, empirical instability in machine learning may be closely related to notions of robustness.
Robustness has emerged as an important (but often lacking) property of deep learning models. In
supervised models, this is exemplified by adversarial examples that fool state-of-the-art, human-level
classifiers [21, 40]. While there has been a large body of work on robust discriminative models, robust
generative models (GANs) are less well studied. Recent work [6, 41] studies the robustness of GANs to
corrupted images (or labels in the conditional case). In this work, we explore an orthogonal route: the
success of GANs relies on intricate internal interactions between a generator and a discriminator, which
provides another source of vulnerability or instability. A better understanding of the stability of those
interactions offers a better understanding of GANs, and may suggest improved, more stable models
that are robust to internal perturbations and also train more stably. Hence, in this work, we aim to (1)
theoretically characterize notions of robustness that capture internal sensitivities specific to GANs, and
(2) identify model properties that affect those sensitivities.
Despite the terminology generative adversarial networks, the discriminator in GANs may be viewed as
taking on a cooperative, “teaching” role, and sharing useful feedback with the generator part [19]. In
particular, this teacher does not play the same role that an adversary plays in the type of adversarial
training that makes discriminative models more stable. Yet, this interaction is key to the learning
process. Here, we study the robustness of this interaction by, possibly adversarially, interfering with the
interaction, and endowing the teacher with a simultaneous adversarial role. This leads to a new notion
of robustness for GANs. Specifically, we perturb the feedback from discriminator to the generator, i.e.,
with a certain probability, the generator receives a perturbed signal from the discriminator, illustrated in
Figure 1.
Our framework has several interpretations. First, in GANs, the only signal the generator receives
about the data is via the discriminator, so, similar to notions of robustness perturbing the data, this
perturbation also perturbs the channel from data to the learner. Second, this framework may be viewed
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Figure 1: GAN with internal perturbation, i.e., an adversary changing the discriminator’s feedback.
as a constrained dishonest discriminator (instead of a mere “teacher”), or as an adversary interfering with
the channel between discriminator and generator. This viewpoint relates to ideas in differential privacy
[16] where perturbations are used to hide information. E.g., the data may be stored in private databases,
and the discriminator teaches but simultaneously masks the data to preserve privacy.
Contributions. In short, we make the following contributions: (1) We formulate a new notion of
robustness for GANs that naturally arises from its internal interactive learning dynamics. (2) We show
that, perhaps surprisingly, the original GAN is not robust in this sense, even to very small perturbations.
(3) We establish general theoretical conditions on the model (objective function) that induce robustness
and investigate them empirically. (4) Inspired by our theoretical results, we extend our framework and
obtain a class of models that relates to and extends Wassterstein GANs, and performs well empirically.
We will also see that WGAN-like linear losses belong to our robust class, providing a new perspective
on their empirical success.
Further Related Work. Most existing work on GANs aims at improving among three directions:
formulations (objective functions), network architectures, and training dynamics. Examples include
deriving objective functions based on different divergence measures between probability distributions
[2, 31]; adding multiple discriminators or generators, or an unsupervised channel in GANs [11],
exploiting that multiple sources may improve stability [15, 30, 42]; or devising algorithms that better
regularize the training process [22, 26, 36, 44]. Our work mostly studies the first direction, but takes a
different perspective. In addition, robustness in general has recently gained much attention in machine
learning, notably due to the presence of adversarial examples [21, 40]. There is a growing body of work
on understanding attack and defense mechanisms [3, 9, 10, 17, 23, 32, 37, 43, 48, 50]. Several works
[12, 27, 49] rely on perturbing the input data during training. Distributionally robust optimization
[18, 29, 38] that perturbs the data-generating distribution has also been applied in adversarial training
[39]. At a higher level, studying the perturbation of input data is not new, and many ideas in
modern robust machine learning are inherently connected to classical robust statistics [25] and robust
optimization [4, 8]. Yet, the actual definition of robustness and the perturbation can be model-dependent
and may require new formulations. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, robustness in the context
of GANs has not yet been studied formally.
2 Failure of GANs for a Simple Adversary
We begin with an illustrative example: the perhaps surprising observation that the standard GAN can
fail even with a rare perturbation of the discriminator. The standard GAN’s objective function is:
min
G
max
D
V(G, D) = min
G
max
D
{Ex∼Pdata [log D(x)] +Ez∼Pz [log(1− D(G(z)))]}, (2.1)
where D : Rd → [0, 1] is a discriminator that maps a sample to the probability that it comes from
the true data distribution Pdata, and G : Rl → Rd is the generator that maps a noise vector z ∈ Rl ,
drawn from a simple distribution Pz, to the data space. This in turn defines an implicit distribution
PG for G’s generated data. It can be shown that, when fixing G, the optimal discriminator D is
given by D∗G(x) =
Pdata(x)
Pdata(x)+PG(x)
[20]. The generator then essentially seeks to minimize V(D∗G, G) =
− log(4) + 2× JSD(Pdata‖PG), and the optimal generator would give PG = Pdata.
Existing work implicitly assumes that during training, the discriminator is honest, i.e., it always gives
“true feedback” to the generator about how likely it deems the generated sample to come from Pdata.
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What happens if this no longer holds true? E.g., there could be channel contamination, adversarial
interventions, or constraints such as privacy that prevent the discriminator from releasing precise
feedback. Formally, we treat such dishonest feedbacks as applying a transformation Φ(·) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] to
the discriminator’s outputs so that the generator receives Φ(D(x)). One may view Φ as an adversary
that encodes what the generator actually receives. Not knowing about the existence of such an adversary,
the generator regards Φ(D(x)) as honest feedback.
Ideally, we desire a robust GAN model: if Φ does not alter the original outputs D(x) too much,
the model should still be able to learn the data distribution. Is this true for the standard GAN? Let us
consider a simple flipping adversary defined as follows:
Φ(D(x)) =
{
1− D(x) with probability p
D(x) otherwise. (2.2)
That is, with error probability p, the feedback is flipped to be 1− D(x). Note that we assume the signal
from G to D to be always correct, i.e., D always receives the original real and generated data. As such,
the optimal discriminator is still D∗G. With the flipping adversary, the minimization problem for G then
becomes
min
G
p
{
Ex∼Pdata [log(1− D∗G(x))] +Ex∼PG [log D∗G(x)]
}
+
(1− p){Ex∼Pdata [log D∗G(x)] +Ex∼PG [log(1− D∗G(x))]}. (2.3)
Lemma 1. Given the optimal discriminator D∗G, the minimization of the objective (2.3) becomes
min
G
2× JSD(Pdata||PG)− log(4)− p {KL(Pdata||PG) + KL(PG||Pdata)} . (2.4)
Furthermore, for every p > 0, the optimal PG can be arbitrarily far from Pdata in terms of the KL-divergence.
For an intuitive understanding, note that for any p > 0, if PG = Pdata, then the objective function
in (2.4) becomes 0. But, because of the term −p {KL(Pdata||PG)+ KL(PG||Pdata)}, the objective function
can be much smaller; it can be −∞. To see this, note that the Jensen-Shannon divergence is bounded,
but the KL-divergence is not. Any PG that has a disjoint support from Pdata can make the above term
−∞. For example, a learned distribution PG that only concentrates on a particular mode of Pdata with
no coverage on the other modes is optimal, achieving −∞ for the objective function in (2.4). Such a
behavior of mode collapse is highly undesirable for the generator.
Essentially, Lemma 1 establishes that even for very small perturbations, the GAN is not robust: even
if the discriminator is almost always honest, it fails to extract sufficient information from the data. This
observation raises the question whether it is possible to construct a robust GAN, and, if so, what types
of adversaries other than the flipping adversary it can defend against. Next, we formally define families
of adversarial attacks and corresponding conditions for robustness.
3 GAN with Dishonest Discriminators
Motivated by the simple flipping adversary, we next consider a broader class of adversaries. This will
lead to a more general framework and notion of robustness.
3.1 Dishonest Discriminators
We formalize dishonest discriminator feedbacks as post-processing the original outputs D(x) (or corre-
sponding gradients) by an adversary. Since D(x) is typically viewed as the probability of the data
coming from the true distribution, the transformed feedback should still lie in the range [0, 1]. More
explicitly, we use a differentiable transformation function ψ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] as perturbation or dishonest
function. The flipping adversary (2.2) consists of two perturbations: ψ1(y) = 1− y and ψ2(y) = y. An
adversary can combine several such transformations into a more complex attack:
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Definition 2 (Adversary). Let Ψ be a set of perturbations. An adversary Φ with respect to Ψ is a
probability distribution over finitely many perturbations, ψ1,ψ2 . . .ψL ∈ Ψ. Denote by pi the probability
the adversary assigns to the ith perturbation ψi. Given input y ∈ [0, 1], the adversary outputs Φ(y) =
ψi(y) with probability pi.
Definition 2 generalizes the flipping adversary defined in (2.2) to more powerful and flexible attacks.
In general, we do not expect to be able to construct GANs that are robust against all possible adversaries
– imagine the adversary always replaces the signal with random noise. Instead, we will assume that
most of the time the feedback is honest.
Definition 3 (Mostly Honest Adversary). An adversary Φ is mostly honest if the probability it assigns to
the function ψ(y) = y is larger than 0.5.
We will refer to a GAN as robust if it learns the data distribution with a mostly honest adversary.
Intuitively, it seems reasonable that a mostly honest adversary should retain sufficient signal to learn, if
the learning is not too sensitive to perturbations. Yet, with this definition of robustness, the standard
GAN is not robust.
3.2 GAN Formulation with Adversaries
Before adding an adversary, we revisit the GAN objective in Eq. (2.1). The log function in the objective
was suggested because of its nice information-theoretic interpretation. Recent variants such as the
Wasserstein GAN [2] replace the log with other functions. In a unified framework, one could think of
the GAN objectives as:
max
D
Ex∼Pdata [ fD(D(x))] +Ez∼Pz [ fD(1− D(G(z)))], (3.1)
min
G
Ex∼Pdata [ fG(D(x))] +Ez∼Pz [ fG(1− D(G(z)))]. (3.2)
In the standard GAN, fD(·) = fG(·) = log(·). In presence of an adversary Φ, the generator receives
transformed feedback Φ(D(x)) instead of D(x), as shown in Figure 1. However, this information is
not known to the generator. In other words, without knowing the existence of such an adversary, the
generator treats Φ(D(x)) as if it is D(x). The generator’s objective then becomes
min
G
Ex∼Pdata,Φ[ fG(Φ(D(x)))] +Ez∼Pz ,Φ[ fG(1−Φ(D(G(z))))] (3.3)
≡ min
G
L
∑
i=1
pi
(
Ex∼Pdata [ fG(ψi(D(x)))] +Ez∼Pz [ fG(1− ψi(D(G(z))))]
)
. (3.4)
In summary, with an adversary Φ, the discriminator’s objective (3.1) remains unchanged, because the
adversary does not affect what the discriminator receives. In contrast, the generator’s objective becomes
Eq. (3.4).
4 Robustness against Perturbed Feedbacks
We are now ready to study conditions on fD and fG that imply robustness. When designing these
functions, we need to keep three aspects in mind: (1) The objective (3.1) of the discriminator aims
to maximize the probability that the discriminator can distinguish true data from fake data; (2) the
objective (3.4) of the generator aims to minimize the probability that the discriminator recognizes the
generated data as fake; (3) when there is no adversary or the adversary is mostly honest, the optimal
generator G∗ should be able to learn the true data distribution, i.e., PG∗ = Pdata.
The first two criteria are easily met by choosing fG and fD to be monotonically increasing. For
robustness, we already saw that the log function is not suitable. To construct robust models, we will
need the class H of odd functions around 0.5 with support [0, 1]:
H , { f (·) : f is strictly increasing and differentiable in [0, 1], and f (θ) = − f (1− θ), ∀ θ ∈ [0, 1]}.
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Lemma 4 characterizes the optimal discriminator when fD ∈ H.
Lemma 4. Suppose that fD ∈ H. For a fixed G, the optimal D that maximizes the objective (3.1) is
D∗G(x) =
 1, if Pdata(x) > PG(x),0, if Pdata(x) < PG(x),
[0, 1], if Pdata(x) = PG(x),
(4.1)
where the notation D∗G(x) = [0, 1] means that D
∗
G(x) can be any scalar in the interval [0, 1].
In the following, we construct two GAN frameworks that are robust under mostly honest adversaries.
The first framework retains the log function for the discriminator and chooses a function from H for the
generator:
Framework 1: fD = log(·) and fG ∈ H.
Theorem 5 establishes the robustness of Framework 1 under mild conditions on the perturbations ψ:
Theorem 5. Suppose that fD(·) = log(·) and fG ∈ H. Let Ψ be the set of perturbations ψ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] that
satisfy either one of the following:
1. ψ(θ) is non-decreasing in [0, 1] and ψ( 12 ) =
1
2 ;
2. ψ(θ) is non-increasing in [0, 1], ψ( 12 ) =
1
2 , and{
ψ(θ) + θ ≥ 1, for θ ∈ ( 12 , 1],
ψ(θ) + θ ≤ 1, for θ ∈ [0, 12 ).
Then, for any mostly honest adversary Φ with respect to Ψ, given the optimal discriminator D∗G, the optimal
generator G∗ satisfies PG∗(x) = Pdata(x).
Unlike Framework 1, the second framework we identify uses functions from H for both the discrimi-
nator and the generator. Such a choice leads to a stronger robustness guarantee against mostly honest
adversaries, without conditions on the perturbations.
Framework 2: fD ∈ H and fG ∈ H.
Theorem 6. Suppose that fD ∈ H and fG ∈ H. Let Ψ be the set of all possible perturbations. Then, for any
mostly honest adversary Φ with respect to Ψ, given the optimal discriminator D∗G, the optimal generator satisfies
PG∗(x) = Pdata(x).
Proof of Theorems 5 and 6 (Sketch): Since the adversary is mostly honest, the probability it assigns to
the function ψ(θ) = θ is larger than 0.5. Without loss of generality, denote by ψ1 the previous function,
i.e., ψ1(θ) = θ. Both frameworks use a function fG from the class H for the generator. By the properties
of H, one can show, by rearranging the terms, that the generator’s objective (3.4) can be rewritten as:
min
G
V1 +V2,
where
V1 ,
(
p1 −
L
∑
i=2
pi
)(
Ex∼Pdata
[
fG
(
D(x)
)]−Ex∼PG[ fG(D(x))]),
V2 ,
L
∑
i=2
pi
(
Ex∼Pdata
[
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)]−Ex∼PG[ fG(ψi(D(x)))+ fG(D(x))]).
It is immediate that if PG = Pdata, then V1 = V2 = 0. Now, if we can show that V1 + V2 is greater
than 0 for any PG 6= Pdata, the two theorems will be established. This amounts to show that for both
frameworks, the following two claims hold:
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1. If Pdata 6= PG, then V1 > 0.
2. If Pdata 6= PG, then V2 ≥ 0.
The two claims can be proved by considering the different optimal discriminator for each framework.
Note that the fact that the adversary Φ is mostly honest guarantees that the term (p1 −∑Li=2 pi) in V1 is
positive. Hence, to establish the first claim, we only need to show that the second term in V1 is positive
if PG 6= Pdata. For the second claim, the terms in V2 involve different perturbations ψi. This is why
Theorem 5 requires some mild conditions on ψ. Under Framework 1, one can show that the second
claim holds if those conditions are satisfied. However, for Framework 2, the second claim can be proved
without additional conditions. See Appendix A for the details. 
Theorems 5 and 6 show that the flipping adversary is just a special case that our GAN frameworks
can defend against. In fact, the theorems provide a stronger robustness guarantee that holds across a
variety of mostly honest adversaries. The second framework is significantly stronger than the first. In
particular, Framework 2 requires no additional conditions on the perturbations. As long as the adversary
is mostly honest, robustness is guaranteed. Hence, for robust GANs, it is desirable to use functions in
H instead of the logarithm.
With fD(θ) = fG(θ) = θ − 0.5, the resulting model not only belongs to Framework 2, the loss
functions are also closely related to the well-known Wasserstein GAN. Both models use linear functions
in the objectives. The differences are: (1) the last layer of the discriminator in WGAN is linear and hence,
the outputs are unnormalized raw scores instead of probabilities; (2) to minimize the dual form of the
Wasserstein metric, the discriminator in WGAN is restricted to be a 1−Lipschitz function. Nevertheless,
this observation may give further support for their empirical performance, besides the interpretation of
using Wasserstein distance.
5 Empirical Results: Robustness
To probe our theoretical results in practice, we empirically evaluate the robustness of the models in
Section 4. Following the convention in most of the GAN literature, we use a zero-sum game formulation,
i.e., fD = fG = f (Framework 2). We test different mostly honest adversaries, and robustness is
guaranteed by Theorem 6. Figure 2(a) displays the functions in H that we investigate. These functions
are chosen to have different gradients in different locations, e.g., constant, relatively smaller, or larger
gradients around the midpoint. We will refer to the GANs with fD, fG ∈ H (i.e., Figure 2(a)) as robust
GANs, and to the standard GAN with fD = fG = log(·) simply as GAN. Details and additional
experiments may be found in Appendix B.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
f(x) =  linear: x 0.5.
f(x) =  shifted tanh: tanh(3(x 0.5)).
f(x) =  shifted erf: erf(2(x 0.5)).
f(x) =  piece-wise linear #1.
f(x) =  piece-wise linear #2.
(a)
Er
ror
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y=
0
Steps: 4K 12K 20K 30K
Er
f_G
AN
GA
N
Steps: 40K 80K 120K 180K
Er
ror
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y=
0.4
Er
f_G
AN
GA
N
(b)
Figure 2: (a) Objective functions for robust GANs. (b) Learning processes with flipping adversaries.
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Regularization and other factors. In practice, apart from the objective function, factors such as
the training algorithm and data also influence the outcome of learning. For example, clipping large
weights or, in general, regularizing the Lipschitz constant of the discriminator [22, 28, 33, 44], appear
to stabilize the overall training process. In particular, any modifications that result in more averaging
and slower adoption of information from single training data points would be expected to make the
GAN more robust. Hence, a fair evaluation of our robust objective functions should take these into
consideration. To this end, in our experiments, we also test the effect of clipping as a representative for
such regularizing mechanisms, and its interplay with the objective function. Clipping was employed
in the original Wasserstein GAN [2] and, due to the connections between our framework and WGAN
mentioned before, it is a natural representative choice for regularization.
5.1 Synthetic Data: Mixture of Gaussians
We begin with the common illustrative toy problem of a mixture of eight two-dimensional Gaussians.
Both G and D are fully connected networks. We alternatively train G and D, and clip the weights of D
with a maximum absolute value of 0.1. Here, we apply the simple flipping adversary (2.2) with different
error probabilities p. Figure 2(b) shows some typical results for one of the robust models and GAN, for
p = 0 and p = 0.4. Indeed, as opposed to the GAN, the robust GAN reliably learns all modes, even with
a fairly high p = 0.4. The figure illustrates an additional intuition: with higher noise p, learning indeed
becomes more challenging, and the generator needs more iterations to learn. Figure 9 in Appendix B
confirms this is generally the case.
Clipping. To probe the effect of regularization, we next vary the clipping threshold. Figure 3 shows
the success rate for different clipping thresholds, averaged over 10 runs. Here, a success is defined
as correctly learning all the 8 modes (average number of modes are shown in Appendix B). To better
visualize the effect of clipping, D is intentionally made more powerful by having significantly more
hidden neurons (4x more hidden neurons for each layer).
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Figure 3: Success rates and average number of learned modes for various models and clipping values.
Figure 3 offers several observations: (1) The training algorithm indeed affects the results. A too
powerful disriminator (small threshold) generally impairs learning [2, 28]; very small thresholds limit
the capacity of D too much. (2) However, consistently, if a robust GAN can learn the distribution
without noise (p = 0), then it also learns the distribution with noise, confirming its robustness. In
general, the robust GANs work across a wider range of clipping thresholds, i.e., are less sensitive to
parameter choice of clipping. These observations support our theoretical analysis in Sections 2 and 4.
An interesting phenomenon to note is that in some cases, clipping may increase the empirical
robustness of the standard GAN, although it is still more sensitive than the robust models (threshold
0.05 and p = 0.4). This phenomenon is orthogonal to our theoretical results, which focus on the models
(objective functions); here, the algorithm aids empirical stability via a stronger regularization. This
points to the important role of training algorithms in practice [22, 28, 36, 44]. But here (and next section),
even though clipping may help robustness empirically, the non-robust standard GAN is still more brittle,
also towards the choice of algorithm (amount of regularization), than robust GANs. Extending the
theory to include both aspects, model and algorithm, is an interesting future avenue.
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5.2 MNIST
Next, we perform a similar analysis with the MNIST data, using a CNN for both G and D. Without
clipping, both the GAN and the robust GANs learn the distribution well, and generate all digits with
the same probability. Here, we call a learning experiment a success if G learns to generate all digits with
the same probability (see Appendix B for a plot of the total variation distance between the distribution
of the learned digits and the uniform distribution). To further explore our theoretical frameworks, we
apply a more sophisticated adversary as follows: Φ(D(x)) equals 1− D(x) or √D(x) or D(x)2, each
with probability 0.1, and otherwise, Φ(D(x)) = D(x) (i.e., honest feedback with probability 0.7). By
Theorem 6, all the robust models we explore here should be robust against such a complex adversary.
Figure 4 visualizes the output of the GAN and the “piecewise linear” robust GAN with and without
an attack. Clearly, the GAN is heavily affected by the attack – it appears to learn a point mass that
maximizes the KL-divergence between Pdata and PG, well in line with the theoretical analysis. The
robust GAN, as expected, still performs well.
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Figure 5: Success rates for various models and clipping values.
Clipping. As for the Gaussians, Figure 5 shows the success rate over 10 runs for various clipping
thresholds, with and without attack. As above, the robust models succeed over a wide range of
thresholds, requiring less regularization, both with and without attack. The GAN is stabilized by
clipping, but still very sensitive to attacks and fails completely for thresholds above 0.1. That is, over a
wide range of regularization parameters, the model being robust or not makes a significant difference.
These results align with our previous observations and support the robust models.
In summary, the experiments demonstrate that the identified robust models are indeed robust against
adversaries and have overall more stable training behavior, requiring less regularization in general.
6 Empirical Results: Extensions
A key property ensuring robustness in Theorems 5 and 6 was the symmetry of the transformation
functions fD and fG, i.e., the class H. When deriving the robust models, we took a probabilistic
viewpoint, where the outputs of the discriminator is the normalized probability of being the true image
(i.e., a sigmoid output layer). However, some recent models, e.g., WGAN, do not apply the sigmoid.
Here, we generalize the symmetry property to such raw scores, and obtain a class of models that, as we
will see, performs well empirically.
8
For robust models in Framework 2, i.e., fD, fG ∈ H, the GAN objectives (3.1) and (3.2), become
max
D
Ex∼Pdata [ fD(D(x))]−Ez∼Pz [ fD(D(G(z)))] (6.1)
min
G
Ex∼Pdata [ fG(D(x))]−Ez∼Pz [ fG(D(G(z)))]. (6.2)
Recall that H is the set of increasing functions that are also odd functions around 0.5, in the support
[0, 1], i.e., H is the set of odd functions around the mid-point of the support. When using raw scores
instead of probabilities (i.e., a linear output layer), the support must become (−∞,∞). Therefore, if we
train discriminators using raw scores in (6.1) and (6.2), a natural, straightforward extension is to consider
the set of functions Hˆ that is odd around the mid-point of the support (−∞,∞), i.e., 0. Formally, this
motivates the following class of functions, Hˆ:
Hˆ , { f (·) : f is strictly increasing and differentiable, and f (θ) = − f (−θ)}.
Hence, when training discriminators with raw scores, like WGAN, we use the objectives (6.1) and (6.2),
and choose functions fD ∈ Hˆ and fG ∈ Hˆ. When both fD and fG are linear functions, this strongly
resembles the WGAN. Due to this analogy, we adopt further specifics used with WGAN: regularizing
the Lipschitz constant of the discriminator has been observed to be extremely important [22, 28, 33, 44],
so we also add a gradient penalty component, (||∇xˆD(xˆ)||2 − 1)2, to the discriminator’s objective [22].
See Appendix C for details. In short, this new model class replaces the linear f in WGAN by functions
from Hˆ.
We test these new models on CIFAR10. By convention, we choose functions such that fD = fG = f
and f ∈ Hˆ. Specifically, we consider the following models: (1) f (x) = 3 tanh(0.15x); (2) f (x) =
5erf(0.1x); (3) f (x) = 2x if x ∈ [−0.25, 0.25]; f (x) = √x if x > 0.25; f (x) = −√−x if x < −0.25. We
add the gradient penalty to the discriminator, and use the WGAN-GP code provided in [22], without
changing the architecture or hyperparameters to ensure fair comparisons.
Method Inception Score
ALI [14] 5.34± .05
BEGAN [5] 5.62
DCGAN [34] 6.16± .07
Improved GAN (-L+HA) [36] 6.86± .06
EGAN-Ent-VI [13] 7.07± .10
DFM [46] 7.72± .13
WGAN-GP ResNet [22] 7.86± .07
(1) Tanh-GP ResNet (ours) 7.80± .09
(2) Erf-GP ResNet (ours) 7.76± .07
(3) Square-Root-GP ResNet (ours) 7.93± .08
Table 1: Left: Inception scores on various unsupervised models. The table is borrowed from [22] with
new entries for our results. Right: Samples from the Square-Root-GP model.
Table 1 summarizes inception scores for various models. Our new models yield results competitive
with WGAN-GP, without specific tuning. Additional figures on learning curves and samples may be
found in Appendix C.2. Overall, these empirical results demonstrates that this new model class arising
from our robust class leads to practically appealing results.
7 Conclusion
Since the advent of GANs, much effort has been devoted to improving the original formulation. In
this work, we offer a new viewpoint inspired by the interactive learning dynamics, via probing the
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robustness of GANs to internal perturbations. In particular, we identify conditions for the objective
function that induce robustness and improve stability more generally. Inspired by our theoretical results,
we further extend our framework to obtain models with promising performance. Overall, our study
leads to a formal notion of robustness, and opens avenues for further theoretical and empirical analyses
of how model parameters, regularization, algorithms and data affect this robustness.
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Supplementary Material
A Proofs
This section provides all the missing proofs in the main paper. For convenience, we also repeat the
theorems here.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Given the optimal discriminator D∗G, the minimization of the objective (2.3) becomes
min
G
2× JSD(Pdata||PG)− log(4)− p {KL(Pdata||PG) + KL(PG||Pdata)} .
Furthermore, for every p > 0, the optimal PG can be arbitrarily far from Pdata in terms of KL-divergence.
Proof. Given the optimal discriminator D∗G(x) =
Pdata(x)
Pdata(x)+Pg(x)
, the generator’s objective (i.e., Eq. (2.3))
becomes
(2.3) = min
G
(1− p)Ex∼Pdata
[
log
Pdata(x)
Pdata(x) +PG(x)
]
+ (1− p)Ex∼PG(x)
[
log
PG(x)
Pdata(x) +PG(x)
]
+ pEx∼Pdata
[
log
PG(x)
Pdata(x) +PG(x)
]
+ pEx∼PG(x)
[
log
Pdata(x)
Pdata(x) +PG(x)
]
= min
G
Ex∼Pdata
[
log
Pdata(x)
Pdata(x) +PG(x)
]
+Ex∼PG(x)
[
log
PG(x)
Pdata(x) +PG(x)
]
+ pEx∼Pdata
[
log
PG(x)
Pdata(x)
]
+ pEx∼PG(x)
[
log
Pdata(x)
PG(x)
]
= min
G
2JSD(Pdata||PG)− log 4− pKL(Pdata||PG)− pKL(PG||Pdata).
(A.1)
From the last equality, note that the Jensen-Shannon divergence is bounded, and hence the minimum
value is −∞ whenever the error probability p > 0, which can be achieved, for example, by any PG that
concentrates on a particular point. In contrast, if PG = Pdata, then the objective achieves value − log 4.
Therefore, the discriminator can learn a distribution that is significantly different from Pdata.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. Suppose that fD ∈ H, then for a fixed G, the optimal D that maximize Eq. (3.1) is
D∗G(x) =
 1, if Pdata(x) > Pg(x),0, if Pdata(x) < Pg(x)
[0, 1], if Pdata(x) = Pg(x),
where the notation D∗G(x) = [0, 1] means that D
∗
G(x) can be any scalar in the interval [0, 1].
Proof. Since fD ∈ H, we have
Ex∼Pdata [ fD(D(x))] +Ez∼PZ [ fD(1− D(G(z)))]
=
∫
fD(D(x))Pdata(x) + fD(1− D(x))PG(x)dx
=
∫
fD(D(x))(Pdata(x)−PG(x))dx
(A.2)
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Note that fD is strictly increasing in [0, 1] and D(x) ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, when Pdata(x) > PG(x),
fD(D(x))(Pdata(x)−PG(x)) is maximized at D(x) = 1; when Pdata(x) < PG(x), fD(D(x))(Pdata(x)−
PG(x)) is maximized at D(x) = 0. This shows that the integration (A.2) is maximized by the discrimi-
nator given in Lemma 4.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. Suppose that fD(·) = log(·) and fG ∈ H. Let Ψ be the set of perturbations ψ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
that satisfy either one of the following:
1. ψ(θ) is non-decreasing in [0, 1] and ψ( 12 ) =
1
2 ;
2. ψ(θ) is non-increasing in [0, 1], ψ( 12 ) =
1
2 , and{
ψ(θ) + θ ≥ 1, for θ ∈ ( 12 , 1],
ψ(θ) + θ ≤ 1, for θ ∈ [0, 12 ).
Then, for any mostly honest adversary Φ with respect to Ψ, given the optimal discriminator, the optimal
generator G∗ satisfies PG∗(x) = Pdata(x).
Proof. Fix a mostly honest attack Φ with respect to the set Ψ defined in Theorem 5. By definition, a
mostly honest adversary assigns more than 0.5 probability on the function ψ(θ) = θ. Without loss of
generality, denote by ψ1 the previous function, i.e., ψ1(θ) = θ. Then, with our notation in Definition 2,
p1 > 0.5.
Since fG ∈ H, we can rewrite the generator’s objective function (i.e., Eq.(3.4)) as follows:
V ,
L
∑
i=1
pi
(
Ex∼Pdata
[
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)]
+Ez∼PZ
[
fG
(
1− ψi(D(G(z)))
)])
=
L
∑
i=1
pi
(
Ex∼Pdata
[
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)]−Ex∼PG[ fG(ψi(D(x)))])
=
(
p1 −
L
∑
i=2
pi
)(
Ex∼Pdata
[
fG
(
ψ1(D(x))
)]−Ex∼PG[ fG(ψ1(D(x)))])
+
L
∑
i=2
pi
(
Ex∼Pdata
[
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
ψ1(D(x))
)]−Ex∼PG[ fG(ψi(D(x)))+ fG(ψ1(D(x)))])
=
(
p1 −
L
∑
i=2
pi
)(
Ex∼Pdata
[
fG
(
D(x)
)]−Ex∼PG[ fG(D(x))])︸ ︷︷ ︸
V1
+
L
∑
i=2
pi
(
Ex∼Pdata
[
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)]−Ex∼PG[ fG(ψi(D(x)))+ fG(D(x))])︸ ︷︷ ︸
V2
.
(A.3)
When Pdata = PG, it is obvious that V1 = V2 = 0. In what follows, we prove the following two facts:
1. If Pdata 6= PG, then V1 > 0.
2. If Pdata 6= PG, then V2 ≥ 0.
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Combining the two facts, it is clear that in order to minimize V, the optimal generator G∗ must satisfies
Pdata = PG∗ , and this completes the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof of Fact 1: Note that since fD(·) = log(·), the optimal discriminator for a fixed generator G is
given by D(x) = Pdata(x)
Pdata(x)+PG(x)
[20]. With this optimal discriminator, we then have
Vˆ1 , Ex∼Pdata [ fG(D(x))]−Ex∼PG [ fG(D(x))]
=
∫ {
fG(D(x))Pdata(x)− fG(D(x))PG(x)
}
dx
=
∫
fG
(
Pdata(x)
Pdata(x) +PG(x)
)
(Pdata(x)−PG(x))dx.
To show that PG 6= Pdata implies V > 0, we note that fG ∈ H implies that
f (θ) > 0, for θ ∈ ( 12 , 1],
f ( 12 ) = 0,
f (θ) < 0, for θ ∈ [0, 12 ).
Therefore, for any x such that PG(x) 6= Pdata(x), we have
f
(
Pdata(x)
Pdata(x) +PG(x)
)
(Pdata(x)−PG(x)) > 0.
This means that Vˆ1 > 0 if PG 6= Pdata. By assumption, p1 > 0.5 and hence p1 − ∑Li=2 pi > 0. This
completes the proof. Therefore, V1 = (p1 −∑Li=2 pi)Vˆ1 > 0 if PG 6= Pdata.
Proof of Fact 2: Note that
Ex∼Pdata
[
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)]−Ex∼PG(x)[ f (ψi(D(x)))+ fG(D(x))]
=
∫ [
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)](
Pdata(x)−PG(x)
)
dx.
For any x such that Pdata(x) > PG(x), the optimal discriminator D(x) =
Pdata(x)
Pdata(x)+PG(x)
> 12 . We then
claim that fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
) ≥ 0. To see why this must hold, consider first the case where ψi
satisfies the first condition in Theorem 5. Then,
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)
> f
(1
2
)
+ f
(1
2
)
= 0,
where the first inequality holds because fG is strictly increasing and ψi is non-decreasing. For the case
where ψ satisfies the second condition in Theorem 5, since D(x) > 12 , we then have ψi(D(x)) +D(x) ≥ 1.
Therefore,
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
) ≥ fG(1− D(x))+ fG(D(x)) = − fG(D(x))+ fG(D(x)) = 0,
where we have used the property that fG(1− θ) = − fG(θ).
Similarly, for any x such that Pdata(x) < PG(x), the optimal discriminator D(x) < 12 and we claim
that fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
) ≤ 0. ff Consider first the case where ψi satisfies the first condition in
Theorem 5. Then,
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)
< fG
(1
2
)
+ fG
(1
2
)
= 0.
For the case where ψi satisfies the second condition in Theorem 5, since D(x) < 12 , we then have
ψi(D(x)) + D(x) ≤ 1 and hence
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
) ≤ fG(1− D(x))+ fG(D(x)) = 0.
In conclusion,
[
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)](
Pdata(x)−PG(x)
)
≥ 0 for any x such that Pdata(x) 6=
Pg(x). Therefore, V2 ≥ 0 and this completes the proof of Fact 2.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6. Suppose that fD ∈ H and fG ∈ H. Let Ψ be the set of all possible perturbations. Then, for
any mostly honest adversary Φ with respect to Ψ, given the optimal discriminator, the optimal generator
satisfies PG∗(x) = Pdata(x).
Proof. The proof is quite similar to the proof of Theorem 5. Since fG ∈ H, we can again rewrite the
generator’s objective function (i.e., Eq.(3.4)) as V1 +V2 (i.e., Eq.(A.3). Obviously, when Pdata = PG, it is
obvious that V1 = V2 = 0. Note that since fD ∈ H, the optimal discriminator for a fixed generator is
now given by Lemma 4. In the sequel, we follow the proof of Theorem 5 to show the two facts below
when given the optimal discriminator:
1. If Pdata 6= PG, then V1 > 0.
2. If Pdata 6= PG, then V2 ≥ 0.
The desired result in Theorem 6 then immediately follows.
Proof of Fact 1: Let
Vˆ1 , Ex∼Pdata [ fG(D(x))]−Ex∼PG [ fG(D(x))] =
∫
fG (D(x)) (Pdata(x)−PG(x))dx.
Substitute the optimal discriminator in Lemma 4 into Vˆ1, it can be readily observed that V > 0 whenever
Pdata 6= PG. Specifically, for any x such that Pdata(x) > PG(x), we have fG(D(x)) = fG(1) > 0; for any x
such that Pdata(x) < PG(x), we have fG(D(x)) = fG(0) < 0. Hence, fG (D(x)) (Pdata(x)−PG(x)) > 0
for any x such that Pdata(x) 6= PG(x). This implies, together with the assumption that p1 > 0.5, that
V1 = (p1 −∑Li=2 pi)Vˆ1 > 0 if PG 6= Pdata.
Proof of Fact 2: We now shift gears to V2. Note that
Ex∼Pdata
[
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)]−Ex∼PG(x)[ f (ψi(D(x)))+ fG(D(x))]
=
∫ [
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)](
Pdata(x)−PG(x)
)
dx.
For any x such that Pdata(x) > PG(x), the optimal discriminator in Lemma 4 gives D(x) = 1. Hence,
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)
= fG
(
ψi(1)
)
+ fG
(
1
)
= fG
(
ψi(1)
)− fG(0) ≥ 0, (A.4)
where the second equality follows from the property that f (θ) = − f (1− θ) and the last inequality
holds because ψi(θ) ≥ 0 for every θ ∈ [0, 1] and fG is strictly increasing.
Similarly, for any x such that Pdata(x) < PG(x), the optimal discriminator gives D(x) = 0 and we
then have
f
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ f
(
D(x)
)
= f
(
ψi(0)
)
+ f
(
0
)
= f
(
ψi(0)
)− f (1) ≤ 0. (A.5)
In summary, we have
[
fG
(
ψi(D(x))
)
+ fG
(
D(x)
)](
Pdata(x) − PG(x)
)
≥ 0 for any x such that
Pdata(x) 6= PG(x). Therefore, V2 ≥ 0 and this completes the proof of Fact 2.
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B Experimental Details: Verify Robustness
In this section, we show the details of our experiments as well as figures omitted from the main
text. While the theory assumes the optimal discriminator, practical training relies on gradient-based
algorithms. In our experiments, with the presence of an adversary, each step of training the generator
consists of a forward pass, where the generated images pass through the discriminator D and then the
adversary Φ to produce the signal Φ(D(x)), and a backward pass, where the gradients the generator
received are computed by backpropagating through the adversary Φ first and then the discriminator
D. The presence of an adversary affects the signals as well as the training gradients the generator
received. From the viewpoint of the generator, the discriminator and the adversary as a whole can be
viewed as a “dishonest discriminator" that, upon receiving the genrated images, produces a noisy signal
and the corresponding gradients for the generator. For all the experiments, we train the models by
alternating between updating the generator and the discriminator. If the experiment involves clipping,
then a full update step consists of first clipping the weights of the discriminator, and then updating the
discriminator and the generator once.
B.1 Mixture of Gaussians
The synthetic data is generated from a mixture of 8 two-dimensional Gaussians with equal variance
but different means evenly spaced on a circle. We fix the network architectures and hyper-parameters
throughout the experiments. While it is possible to boost the individual performance by adapting the
hyper parameters to different models and error probabilities, our focus in this section is to establish a
fair comparison among different models and dishonest adversaries.
The generator consists of a fully connected network with 3 hidden layers, each of size 64 with ReLU
activations. The output layer contains two neurons that linearly project the input to 2 dimensions. The
discriminator consists of a fully connected network with 3 hidden layers, each of size 256 with ReLU
activations, followed by a sigmoid output layer. The latent vectors are sampled from a 256-dimensional
multivariate Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and identity covariance matrix. For training algorithms,
we use Adam with a learning rate of 1E−4 and β1 = 0.5 for the generator and RMSprop with a learning
rate of 1E−4 for the discriminator. The size of each minibatch is fixed to 512. Finally, all the models
are trained for 50k steps, 100k steps, and 180k steps when the error probabilities are 0, 0.2, and 0.4,
respectively.
B.1.1 Addition Discussion on Empirical Robustness via Regularization
In our main text (cf. Section 5.1), we have argued the two different robustness mechanisms: the objective
function we developed and the empirical robustness via regularization. In particular, while the standard
GAN formulation is not robust, if the regularization is strong enough (e.g. 0.05 clipping threshold), it
may help regularize and improve the empirical stability. The two mechanisms are orthogonal and we
now provide evidence to show their difference. This will help to confirm that there is no contradiction
to our theory, i.e., the standard GAN formulation is not robust.
To this end, we show in Figure 6 the probabilities D assigns to the true and the generated data
(i.e., D’s output before applying any dishonest adversary) when the clipping threshold is either 0.1
or 0.05. Note the obvious difference between strong regularization (clipping at 0.05) and the weaker
one (clipping at 0.1). For strong regularization, the empirical robustness via regularization mechanism
is dominant: D’s outputs are restricted to be around 0.51, for both real and the generated data, and
hence, regularization prevents extreme outputs that generally impair training. In contrast, with less
regularization, D’s weights have more freedom (i.e., D’s outputs are not restricted to 0.5), and the other
mechanism, robust objective functions, now becomes the dominant one: the robust models learns the
data distribution consistently, with or without the adversary, while the unrobust standard GAN fails to
do so.
1Due to small clipping threshold, D’s weights are restricted to be so small that the unnormalized logits concentrate around 0
(i.e., 0.5 after passing through the sigmoid layer).
17
Figure 6: Discriminator’s outputs averaged over each batch of data. The blue points represent the
outputs for the true data, while the red points represent the outputs for the generated data.
Before closing, we point out one more interesting observation from the robust model (left two plots
in Figure 6) that matches our theory. Recall that if Pdata = PG, the actual output value of the optimal
discriminator in Lemma 4 can be any value in [0, 1]. Indeed, we observe this behavior for the robust
model: for large clipping threshold, D’s output converges to be around 0.85 instead of 0.5.
B.1.2 Additional Samples
Here, we collect all the results for the robust models that are omitted in Figure 2(b). Those models
consistently learn the mixture distribution with or without an adversary.
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Figure 7: Additional samples that are omitted in Figure 2(b).
B.1.3 Averaged Number of Learned Modes
Figure 8 supplements the results presented in Figure 3. Recall that for each model and each parameter
setting, we run 10 experiments. Figure 8 shows the averaged number of modes learned by each model.
The results are consistent with what we presented in the main text (cf., Figure 3 and the corresponding
discussion), namely, the robust models tend to perform better under various settings.
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Figure 8: Averaged number of modes learned by each model.
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B.1.4 Averaged Number of Steps for a Successful Learning
For each experiment, if the model successfully learns all the 8 modes, we count the number of steps
needed and report the average steps in Figure 9. This confirms our intuition: the larger the error
probability is, the more steps the robust models will need to average out the noise and extract the right
signal to help the overall learning.
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Figure 9: Averaged number of steps for a successful learning. Recall that a success means learning all th
8 modes.
B.2 MNIST
We fix the network architectures and hyper-parameters throughout the experiments. The network is
adapted from a publicly available CNN model2. In particular, we remove the Batch Normalization
layers in the generator. The reason for this is to minimize the effect of architectures on robustness so
that we can control as many factors as possible and fairly evaluate how the model itself affects the
overall robustness. On the other hand, BN is kept for the discriminator. Our theory relies on ideal
assumptions of an optimal discriminator. Hence, to verify the theory, it would be beneficial to have a
nice discriminator that can discriminate the true and generated data, and provide useful signals.
We alternate between updating the generator and the discriminator with a minibatch of size 100.
The latent vectors are sampled from the uniform distribution on [−1, 1]256. The generator is trained
using Adam with a learning rate of 2E−4 and β1 = 0.5, while the discriminator is trained by RMSprop
with a learning rate of 5E−5. Each model is trained for 50 epochs.
B.2.1 Additional Discussion on Empirical Robustness via Regularization
Figure 10: Discriminator’s outputs averaged over each batch of data. Upper right: no data points for
the lighter plots after 15K steps because D’s outputs stay at extreme values for a long time, causing
exploding gradients for the generator and eventually numerical errors (nan).
This section reinforces our understanding about the two robustness mechanisms, as discussed
in Section B.1.1. Similarly, Figure 10 shows the discriminator’s outputs for the true and generated
2https://github.com/hwalsuklee/tensorflow-generative-model-collections
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images, without clipping and with clipping at 0.1. The figure indicates a similar phenomenon as for
the Gaussians. A strong regularization improves empirical robustness by restricting D’s outputs from
extreme values. When less regularization is applied, the objective function being robust or not becomes
a dominant effect: with an adversary, the robust model is still successful while the standard GAN fails
completely.
B.2.2 Additional Samples
We show results for those robust models that are not presented in Figure 4. Again, the robust models is
able to defend the adversary and learn to generate the desired digits with no apparent mode collapse.
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Figure 11: Additional samples that are omitted in Figure 4.
B.2.3 TV Distance to the Uniform Distribution
Figure 12 supplements the plots of success rates in Figure 5. For each experiment, when the model
learns to generate digits, we use an auxiliary classifier to classify the generated data and compute
the total variation distance between the learned distribution to the uniform distribution over the 10
digits. Recall that for each model and each parameter setting, we independently run the experiments
for 10 times. Figure 12 shows the resulting total variation distance, averaged over successful runs. Note
that the distance is uniformly small, implying that for the successful runs, there is no mode collapse.
Consequently, this justifies that we can focus on the plot of success rate in Figure 5 and draw conclusions
correspondingly.0
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Figure 12: TV distance to the uniform distribution, averaged over successful runs.
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C Experimental Details: Extensions
For convenience, we restate the models, extended from our theoretical results. The objectives are
max
D
Ex∼Pdata [ fD(D(x))]−Ez∼Pz [ fD(D(G(z)))], (C.1)
min
G
Ex∼Pdata [ fG(D(x))]−Ez∼Pz [ fG(D(G(z)))], (C.2)
where fD ∈ Hˆ and fG ∈ Hˆ. Recall that Hˆ are the set of strictly increasing functions that are also odd
functions around 0. The output of the discriminator is assumed to be the unnormalized raw scores,
which lies in (−∞,+∞), instead of probabilities.
C.1 Gradient Penalty
Since the model that uses the linear functions in Hˆ is almost the same as the Wasserstein GAN, this
motives us to use the successful techniques that have been developed for WGAN to train our models.
In particular, we observe that gradient penalty can be seamlessly applied in our new framework. We
leverage this to also add the same gradient penalty component in WGAN-GP[22] to regularize the
discriminator. Formally, instead of (C.1), the discriminator’s objective now becomes:
min
D
−Ex∼Pdata [ fD(D(x))] +Ez∼Pz [ fD(D(G(z)))] + λExˆ∼Pxˆ [(||∇xˆD(xˆ)− 1)2]
For completeness, we restate the WGAN-GP algorithm in [22], and highlight the differences for
our models in red. Note that the overall algorithm is exactly as in [22], except for very few places.
This means that our models can be easily applied, with almost zero modifications on the existing
implementations.
Algorithm 1 Our framework with gradient penalty. Same as in WGAN-GP, we use values of λ = 10,
nD = 5, α = 0.0001, β1 = 0, β2 = 0.9
Require: the gradient penalty coefficient λ; the number of discriminator iterations per generator
iteration nD; the batch size m; Adam hyperparameters α, β1 and β2; the discriminator parameters w;
the generator parameters θ
1: while θ has not converged do
2: for t = 1, . . . , nD do
3: for i = 1, . . . , m do
4: Sample real data x ∼ Pdata, latent variable z ∼ Pz, a random number e ∼ U[0, 1].
5: x˜ ← Gθ(z)
6: xˆ ← ex + (1− e)x˜
7: L(i) ← fD(Dw(x˜))− fD(Dw(x)) + λ(||∇xˆDw(xˆ)||2 − 1)2
8: end for
9: w← Adam(∇w 1m ∑mi=1 L(i), w, α, β1, β2)
10: end for
11: Sample a batch of latent variables {z(i)}mi−1 ∼ Pz.
12: θ ← Adam(∇θ 1m ∑mi=1− fG(Dw(Gθ(z))), θ, α, β1, β2)
13: end while
C.2 Experimental Setup
We use the publicly available implementation of WGAN-GP with residual network that was used in
the original paper [22]. 3 All the hyperparameters and the network architectures are fixed to the
3https://github.com/igul222/improved_wgan_training/blob/master/gan_cifar_resnet.py
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original settings in the code, without any modifications. We only modify the loss functions to be those
investigated in Section 6. Figure 13 shows how the inception score increases over iterations. Additional
samples that are missing from the main text are shown below.
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Figure 13: Inception Score vs. Iterations
Figure 14: Tanh-GP ResNet Figure 15: Erf-GP ResNet
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